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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TH'E RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
APPLICABLE TO BILLS AND NOTES
A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW
Much uncertainty exists in this country concerning the rules
of the Conflict of Laws applicable to Bills and Notes. In Eng-
land the law on the subject was codified by the Bills of Exchange
Act. The Negotiable Instruments Law fails to lay down rules
for the Conflict of Laws and thus leaves the matter as it was
before. Through the unification of the law of Bills and Notes,
which has resulted from the adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law by practically all of the states of this country, the
conflicts that will arise with respect to such instruments in the
fufiure will result, in the main, where the rules of the Negotiable
Instruments Law of this country come into collision with those
of a foreign nation. Though there are some important differ-
ences between the Negotiable Instruments Law and the English
Bills of Exchange Act it may be said that there exists, on the
whole, quasi-uniformity in the law of Bills and Notes of the
English speaking countries. Wide divergencies continue to exist,
however, between the Anglo-American system and that of other
countries, which is embodied now in the Convention of the
Hague, of June, 191:2. As the prospect that these differences
will disappear in the course of the next half century is quite
remote, a study of the rules of Private International Law which
should govern where the rules of the Anglo-American system
come into conflict with those of the Convention of the Hague is
not without practical interest. In view of the many uncertainties
in our law a codification of the rules of the Conflict of Laws on
the subject would be highly desirable so that a greater uniformity
of decision might be obtained in this regard/ Such a codification
should be undertaken, if possible, with a full knowledge of the
best thought on the subject in other countries. It is the object
of the present article to make such a preliminary investigation
in the hope that it may throw some light upon the actual prob-
lems which will demand solution in any attempted codification of
the Conflict of Laws relating to Bills and Notes. The ends of
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this article will be subserved best if the comparative study be
limited to those continental countries which have given, on the
whole, most thought to the study of the subject under considera-
tion. These are, beyond question, France, Germany, and Italy.
The discussion of the law of other foreign countries, excepting
that of England, would tend to obscure the main issues without
adding anything especially new or helpful.
I. CAPACITY
Neither the Negotiable Instruments Law, nor the Bills of
Exchange Act, nor the Hague Convention has attempted to lay
down a uniform municipal rule governing capacity. In England
and the United States the ordinary rules relating to capacity
apply also to bills and notes.' On the continent there were for-
merly many special restrictions affecting the capacity of parties
to obligate themselves by means of bills and notes, and in a few
countries some of these restrictions still subsist. 2 The principal
conflicts that may arise will relate to the capacity of married
women and infants. What should be the rule in the Conflict of
Laws governing their capacity to bind themselves by bill or note?
I. English law: The Bills of Exchange Act3 does not answer
the above question. The general rule governing commercial con-
tracts therefore applies. What the English law on the subject
is cannot be stated with certainty. There appears to be only a
single case throwing direct light upon the subject, that of Male v.
Roberts.4 In that case an action was brought in England to re-
cover a sum of money advanced in Scotland to an infant who
appears to have been domiciled in England. Lord Eldon, at
Nisi Prius, held that the defense of infancy depended upon the
lex loci contractus, the law of Scotland. At the time the decision
was rendered, the English law seemingly favored the view, both
with respect to ordinary commercial contracts and contracts of
1. For a comparative statement of the municipal law relating to capacity,
see Weiss, Trait6 de Droit International Prive, 2nd ed., IV., pp. 439-440;
Ottolenghi, La Cambiale nel Diritto Internazionale, pp. 43-44; Diena,
Trattato di Diritto Commerciale Internazionale, III, pp. 42-44.
2. So, for example, officers in the active army in Austria. See, Jettel,
Handbuch des internationalen Privat-und Strafrechts, p. 117.
3. Section 72 (2) lays down the rule that the "interpretation" of the
drawing, indorsement, acceptance or acceptance supra protest of a bill is
determined by the law of the place where such contract is made. But
this term is not comprehensive enough to include "capacity." See, Lafleur,
The Conflict of Laws in the Province of Quebec, p. 184.
4. (1800) 3 Esp. 163.
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marriage, that the law of the place where a contract was entered
into determined the capacity of the parties.", A noticeable change
in the English cases appears during the latter half of the nine-
teenth century, indicating a decided tendency to adopt 'the con-
tinental view, which regards the question of capacity as belong-
ing to the personal law and as subject, therefore, to the lex
domicilii or the lex patriae.6 In the case of Sottomayor v. De
Barros7 the Court of Appeal per Cotton, J. says: "As in other
contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity must depend
on the law of the domicile." And this rule is said to be "a well
recognized principle." In Cooper v. Cooper8 the Lord Chan-
cellor, Lord Halsbury, makes the categorical statement that
"The capacity to contract is regulated by the law of domicile."
These statements were mere dicta, as both cases related to mar-
riage. Foote9 feels, nevertheless, that the dictum of the Court
of Appeal in Sottomayor v. De Barros "has unsettled the whole
subject, if, indeed, it has not gone further, and established the
right of the lex domicilii to decide all questions of capacity for
every purpose."
The recent cases of Ogden v. Ogden10 and Chetti v. Chetti l
seem to support the lex loci contractus, but these cases, likewise,
involve capacity for marriage and it is not clear that the state-
ments were intended to apply to ordinary mercantile contracts.
5. Lord Stowell expressed this view forcibly in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple,
(1811) 2 Hagg. Cons. 54, a case involving capacity for marriage, in the
following words: "It is an indispensable rule of law, as exercised in all
civilized countries, that a man who contracts in a country, engages for
a competent knowledge of the law of contracts in that country. If he
rashly presumes to contract without such knowledge, he must take the
inconveniences resulting -from such ignorance upon himself, and not
attempt to throw them upon the other party, who has engaged under a
proper knowledge and sense of the obligation which the law would impose
upon him by virtue of that engagement."
In another case (Ruding v. Smith, 1821, 2 Hagg. Cons. 371) Lord
Stowell expressly guarded himself as being understood as favoring the
lex domicilii. "I do not mean to say," he says, "that Huber is correct in
laying down as universally true, that 'personales qualitates, alieni in certo
loco jure impressas, ubique circumferri, et personam comitari,' that a
man, being of age in his own country, is of age in every other country,
be the law of majority in that country what it may."
6. Int 1860 Sir Creswell still laid down the old rule regarding capacity
for marriage, stating in general terms that the capacity to contract is
subject to the lex loci contractus. Simonin v. Mallac, 1860, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67;
29 L. J. Mat. 97; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 561; 2 L. T. 327.
7. (1877) 3P.D. (C.A.) 1, atp. 5;44L. J. P. 23;3 P. D. 1; 37L. T.
415; 26 W. R. 455.
8. (1888) 13 App. Cas. H. L. Sc. 88, at p. 99; 59 L. J. 1.
9. Foote, Private International Jurisprudence, 4th ed., pp. 338-339.
10. (1908) P. (C. A.) 46; 77 L. J. P. 34; 97 L. T: 827; 24 T. L. R. 94.
11. (1909) P. 67. 78 L. J. P. 23; 99 L. T. 885; 55S. J. 163; 25 T. L. R. 146.
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The absence of recent decisions on the question of commer-
cial. capacity and the uncertain pronouncements on the 'ubject
by the English courts in connection with marriage contracts
make it impossible to state what the English law actually is.
Westlake' 2 is of the opinion that the net result of the English
decisions supports the view that the law of domicile governs the
capacity to contract, except that in marriage contracts, the lex
loci celebrationis must also be satisfied. Dicey13 concludes, on
the other hand, that the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in Male
v. Roberts remains unaffected by the later English cases, and
that the capacity to enter commercial contracts is probably to be
determined by the law of the country where the contract was
made.
2. American Law: The American law is in a somewhat less
uncertain state than the English. As the commercial life of the
nation grew, the lex domicilii was found inconvenient, and was
discarded as inconsistent with our conditions, at least as regards
married women. 14 The prevailing rule thus became the lex loci
contractus.'1 A remnant of the lex domicilii is found in those
decisions which hold that the courts of the domicile of an infant 6
12. Private International Law, 5th ed., pp. 43, 46-48.
13. Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., Rule 149, exception 1, p. 538.
14. "We do not think the continental rule applicable to our situation
and condition. A state has the undoubted right to define the capacity or
incapacity of its inhabitants, be they residents or temporary visitors; and
in this country where travel is so common, and business has so little
regard for state lines, it is more just, as well as more convenient, to have
regard to the laws of the state of contract as a uniform rule operating
on all contracts, and which the contracting parties may be presumed to
have had in contemplation when making their contracts than to require
them, at their peril, to know the domicile of those with whom they deal,
and to ascertain the law of that domicile, however remote, which in many
cases could not be done without such delay as would greatly cripple the
power of contracting abroad at all." Deemer, J., in Nichols & Shepard
Co. v. Marshall, (1899) 108 Iowa, 518, 79 N. W. 282.
15. Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall, (1899) 108 Iowa 518, 79 N. W.
282; International Harvester Co. v. McAdams, (1910) 142 Wis. 114. 124
N. W. 1042; Thompson v. Taylor, (1901) 66 N . J. Law 253; 49 Atl. 544;
54 L. R. A. 585; 88 Am. St. Rep. 485; .Bell v. Packard, (1879) 69 Me.
105; 31 Am. Rep. 251; Milliken v. Pratt, (1877) 125 Mass. 374; 28 Am.
Rep. 241.
Story preferred already the lex loci contractus in his famous work on
the Conflict of Laws and contributed largely to the adoption of the rule
in this country. In Section 102 of his treatise he says, "Secondly,: As to
acts done, and rights acquired and contracts made in other countries
(than the place of domicile), touching property therein the law of the
country where the acts are done, the rights are acquired, or the contracts
are made, will generally govern in respect to the capacity, state, and condi-
tion of persons."
16. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, (1912) 206 N. Y. 188; 99
N. E. 722. The court in this case, per Vann, J., said, "We think that the
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or a married woman 7 may decline to enforce their contracts en-
tered into in a foreign state and valid under the law of such
state, when their enforcement would contravene the established
policy of the forum having for its object the protection of in-
fants and married women.
The same rule applies where the contract is made by cor-
respondence.' 8  The law of the place of payment, or the law of
the state with reference to which the parties may have intended
to contract, is of no consequence.'
Whether the above rules apply to infants' contracts can not
be stated definitely. Thompson v. Ketcham02 appears to be the
only case involving the question. This case was decided, how-
ever, upon its second appeal to the Supreme Court of New York,
on a question of evidence. On the first appeal the plea of in-
fancy was held to be controlled by the law of the place of per-
formance, and it seems that Chancellor Kent, who wrote the
facts stated show that the contract wherever made was to be performed
by both parties substantially in this state and that it should be governed
by its laws. Our courts will not enforce the contract of an infant against
him, even if technically it was completed by acceptance in another state,
when his promise was not only made here but entire performance by one
party and substantial performance by the other was to be made here.
Otherwise it would be easy to deprive an infant of the protection which
our law affords him on grounds of public policy."
17. First National Bank v. Shaw. (1902) 109 Tenn. 237; 70 S. W. 807;
59 L. R. A. 498; 97 Am. St. Rep. 840; Armstrong v. Best, (1893) 112 N. C.
59; 17 S. E. 14; 25 L. R. A. 188; 34 Am. St. Rep. 473.
18. Milliken v. Pratt, (1877) 125 Mass. 374; 28 Am. Rep. 241; Thompson
v. Taylor, (1901) 66 N. J. L. 253; 49 Ati. 544; 54 L. R. A. 585; 88 Am.
St. Rep. 485.
19. Cockburn v. Kingsley, (1913) 25 Colo. App. 89; 135 Pac. 1112; Gar-
rigue v. Kellar, (1905) 164 Ind. 676; 74 N. E. 523; 69 L. R. A. 870; 108
Am. St. Rep. 324; Campbell v. Crampton, 18 Blatchf. 150; Hager v. Nat.
German American Bank, (1898) 105 Ga. 116; 31 S. E. 141; but see Mayer
v. Roach, (1909) 77 N. J. L. 681; 75 Atl. 235; Basilea & Calandra v.
Spagnuola, (1910) 80 N. J. L. 88; 77 Atl. 531.
20. (1809) 4 Johns. 285; (1811) 8 Johns. 189.
In this case suit was brought in New York upon a note executed in
Jamaica, the defense being infancy. The judge charged the jury that as
the contract was made in Jamaica, it must be governed by the laws of
that island, and as there was no proof that the laws of Jamaica protect
infants against such contracts, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Thejury accordingly found a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment on the ground that the testimony in the case showed
the note to be payable in New York on the arrival of the parties there, so
that the law of New York would govern. "For, it is a well settled rule,"
said the learned Court. "that where a contract is made in reference to
another country in which it is to be executed, it must be governed by the
laws of the place where it is to have its effect." (4 Johns, at p. 288).
When the case came again before the Supreme Court the parol testimony
that the payment of the note was to be made in New York was held
inadmissible. The defendant not having proved the law of Jamaica,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
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opinion of the court, when the case came before it the second
time, concurred in that view.
2 1
The suggestion has been made that, inasmuch as infants' con-
tracts are not void, but voidable only, the defense of infancy be-
ing in the nature of a privilege granted to the infant, these cases
do not involve a question of capacity in any true sense, but the
obligation of the contract, which, in accordance with the general
weight of authority in this country, is controlled by the law of
the place of performance.2 2  There is no decision, however,
which sanctions such a distinction. The question is actually re-
garded by the English and American courts as one relating to
capacity.
Where the question concerns not so much the consequences
of infancy as the fact of infancy itself, the lex domicilii enters
as a third factor to complicate the problem. Assuming that the
lex loci contractus governs the consequences of the plea of in-
fancy, does the same law decide also whether or not a person
is of age? Where a party has reached the age of majority under
the local law, the defense that he is still a minor under the lex
domicilii would probably be denied. It is more doubtful whether,
in the converse case, that is, where the party is a major under
the law of his domicile, but is still a minor under the law of the
place of contracting, the defense of infancy could be set up.
There are dicta, but no square decisions, to the effect that the
law of the place where the contract was entered into should con-
trol.
23
3. French Law:24 The capacity of French subjects is deter-
mined by French la.,v irrespective of the place where the bill or
21. "The lex loci is to govern, unless the parties had in view a different
place, by the terms of the contract. Si partes alium in contrahendo locum
respexerint. This is the language of Huber. Lord Mansfield, in Robin-
son v. Bland, (2 Burr. 1077) says, 'The law of the place can never be the
rule where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law
of another country, and that was the case with the contract in that
cause."' Kent. Ch. J., 8 Johns., at p. 193.
22. Parmele, in Wharton's Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 3d ed., p.
911; also in note 26 L. R. A. (N. S.), at page 769. But see Minor, Conflict
of Laws, p. 149, note.
23. See Andrews v. His Creditors, (1838) 11 La. 464; Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 52 Mo. App. 357; Huey's Appeal, (1854) 1
Grant's Cas. 51. See also Wharton, 3d ed., pp. 264-265.
A number of cases which rejected the lex domicilii as determining the
status of a party as a major involved the question of the party's capacity
to sue (Gilbreath v. Bunce, (1877) 65 Mo. 349) or to control a judgment
(Harris v. Berry, (1884) 82 Ky. 137) and not ordinary commercial
capacity.
24. Since the days of the statutists the view has generally prevailed on
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note is executed or payable.2 :; The personal (national) law is
applied also to foreigners. A party can not avail himself of his
foreign personal law if he has fraudulently concealed the same,
or if its application would contravene the public policy of
France.20 The courts have tended to disregard the foreign per-
sonal law in favor of the lex loci contractus, also, when the in-
terests of a Frenchman, who had exercised due care, would be
prejudiced by its application. 27
4. German Law: The German law is found in Article 84
of the German Exchange Law of 1849, which reads as follows:
"The capacity of a foreigner to incur liabilities under ex-
change law is to be decided according to the law of the state to
which he belongs. Nevertheless, a foreigner, incapable of con-
tracting by exchange law according to the law of his own coun-
try, is liable within the Empire (Inland), if he incur such liabili-
ties, in so far as he is so capable according to inland law."'28
This rule has now become the general rule governing the
Conflict of Laws, for Article 7 of the Law of Introduction of the
Civil Code provides:
the continent that the personal law, formerly the lex domicilii, to-day
more commonly the law of nationality (lex patriae), should determine
both the status and the contractual capacity of parties.
For a discussion of the views of the early jurists, see Lain6, Introduc-
tion au Droit International Priv6, II pp. 116-198; Burge, Commentaries
on Colonial and Foreign Laws, new ed., pp. 471-474; Story, Colflict of
Laws, 8th ed., pp. 69-84.
In the event of a change of domicile the more general opinion favored
the law of the actual domicile at the time of contracting and not that of
the domicile of origin. See Lain6, II, pp. 199-217. So also the modern
authors. See Savigny, Private International Law, Guthrie's translation,
p. 355; v. Bar's Private International Law, Gillespie's translation, pp. 317-
318.
25. Code Civil, Art. 3.
26. Weiss, Trait6 de Droit International P-ivdi 2d ed., IV, p. 442.
27. Cass. Jan. 16, 1861 (D. 1861, 1, 193), App. Bordeaux, Apr. 11, 1906
(33 Clunet 1119) ; App. Lyon, Apr. 30, 1907 (35 Clunet 141). See also,
Vincent et Penaud, Dictionnaire de Droit International Priv6, pp. 339-340,
Weiss, IV, pp. 442-443, note; Lyon-Caen et Renault, Trait6 de Droit
Commercial, 4th ed., IV, pp. 542-543, note.
28. The same provision is found in the Hungarian Law of 1876 (Art.
95) ; the Scandinavian Law of 1880 (Art. 84) ; the -Swiss Law of Obliga-,
tions of 1881 (Art. 822); the Commercial Code of Servia (Art. 168);
the Russian Law on Bills and Notes (Art. 82), and the law of Brazil of
1908 (Art. 42). See, Weiss, IV, p. 443.
The exception to the application of the personal law was adopted in
Germany only after a long debate at the Conference of Leipzig, on
grounds of commercial convenience, by a vote of 10 to 9. It was aimed
primarily at the special incapacities relating to bills and notes which ex-
isted in many of the continental states. The wording of the exception in
favor of the lex loci contractus was couched, however, in such broad
terms as to 'cover all kinds of incapacity, general or special. See, Staub,
Kommentar zur allgemeinen deutschen Wechselordnung. 3d ed., Art. 84;
Meili, Internationales Civil- und Handelsrecht, II, pp. 327-329.
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"The business capacity of a person (Geschiftsfiihigkeit) is
adjudged according to the laws of the state to which he belongs.
"If a foreigner enters into a legal transaction in this country
as to which he is not competent, or is restricted in his capacity,
he is as to such transactions to be regarded as competent in so
far as he, under the German laws, would be competent to act.
This provision does not apply to transactions relative to family
rights and to rights of inheritance, as well as to transactions dis-
posing of real estate in a foreign country."2'
The above concession in favor of the lex loci contractus is
restricted to transactions entered into in Germany. 30 Whenever
the contract is executed in a foreign country, the national law of
the party in question will control without qualification. This is
true though the law of such country should make a similar con-
cession in favor of the lex loci contractus as the German law.3'
Where the national law has adopted the lex domicilii as the rule
governing capacity, and the domicile of the party is in Germany,
German law will be held to control.32
5. Italian Law: According to Article 6 of the Preliminary
Dispositions of the Civil Code, "The status and the capacity of
persons and the family relations are regulated by the law of tht
state of which they are subjects."
Article 58 of the Commercial Code provides, however, that
"The form and the essential requisites of commercial obligations
* * * are regulated respectively by the laws and usages of
the place where the obligations are created * * *"
An express reservation is made by Article 58 in favor of the
application of Article 9 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the
Civil Code, according to which the national law will govern
when both parties have the same nationality.
The Italian authors are divided on the question whether the
"essential requisites of commercial obligations" are to be under-
29. A similar provision exists in regard to capacity to sue or to be sued.
Such capacity exists if it is conferred by the national law or by German
law. Sec. 55, German Code of Civil Procedure; Barazetti, Das Interna-
tionale Privatrecht im biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche ffir das deutsche Reich,
p. 43.
30. The place of performance is immaterial, RG, Oct. 16, 1885, (Clunet,
Journal de Droit International Priv6, 1887, p. 630).
31. v. Bar, p. 669; Niemeyer, das internationale Privatrecht des bfirger-
lichen Gesetzbuchs, pp. 125-126.
32. Art. 27, Law of Introduction, Civil Code.
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stood as including capacity.33  In the opinion of some,34 the
article refers only to the general objective requirements for bills
and notes specified in Article 251 of the Commercial Code, and
not to capacity. "According to the opinion that has finally pre-
vailed," says Diena 3 5 "the essential requisites of commercial
obligations, to which Article 58 alludes, are all those contemplated
by Article 11o4 of the Civil Code, among which is included the
capacity to contract." The lex loci contractus will determine not
only the capacity of foreigners in Italy, but also that of Italian
subjects in foreign countries. 36
From the preceding comparative study it is seen that none of
the countries, the law of which has been studied, applies, with-
out qualification, the personal, law of the parties (the lex domicilii
or the lex patriae) in the determination of the capacity of parties
to enter commercial contracts.3 7  This is most noteworthy in
view of the strong stand by continental Europe in support of the
doctrine that the personal law should govern the capacity of
parties in general. Individual authors, in the theoretical atmos-
phere of their study, have expressed the view-that the principle
of the lex patriae should not yield in any respect, on grounds of
expediency, to the lex loci contractus.3 s But whenever they were
confronted with the actual needs of business life, they have not
hesitated to-make such concessions. This appears most distinctly
from the resolutions adopted by international associations, con-
ferences, and congresses. The Association for the Reform and
Codification of International Law, at its session at Antwerp in
1877'9 the Congress of Commercial Law held at Antwerp in
33. The views of the different writers are stated by Diena, Trattato di
Diritto Commerciale Internazionale, I, pp. 14-15, note; Ottolenghi, La
Cambiale nel Diritto Internazionale, pp. 28-43.
34. See Ottolenghi, pp. 37-38.
35. I, p. 138.
36. Diena, III, p. 53.
37. Contra: Quebec, where the lex domicilii is applied, even though the
party would have capacity under the law of Quebec, where the contract
was entered into. Jones v. Dickinson, R. J. R., 7 Quebec S. C. 313;
Lafleur, Conflict of Laws in the Province of Quebec, p. 147.
38. Audinet, Principes 6lmentaires du Droit International Priv6, 2d
ed., pp. 607-609, Despagnet, Prdcis de Droit International Priv6, 5th ed.,
p. 986; Ottolenghi, p. 16; Surville et Arthuys, Cours 6lmentaire de Droit
International Priv6, 5th ed., pp. 669-670.
39. Revue de Droit International, 1877, p. 411.
The resolution adopted was as follows: "La capacit6 d'un 6tranger en
matir&e de lettre de change est en gdndral r~gl~e d'apr~s son statut per-
sonnel.
"Toutefois l'6tranger, lorsqu'il contracte des engagements se rattachant
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1885,40 and in Brussels in I888, 4' and the Institute of Interna-
tional Law at its session at Brussels in 1885,2 have all indorsed
the lex loci contractus as an alternative rule to the law of nation-
ality whenever a party, who is incompetent under his foreign per-
sonal law, has capacity to contract under the law of the state
where the contract was made.
Article 74 of the Convention of the Hague for the Unifica-
tion of Bills and Notes of 1912 expresses the same view. It
provides:
"The capacity of a person to bind himself by a bill of ex-
change shall be d9termined by his national law. If such national
law declares the law of another state to be applicable, such latter
law shall be applied.
"A person who lacks capacity under the law indicated in the
preceding paragraph, shall nevertheless be validly bound, if he
has entered into the obligation within the territory of a state ac-
cording to the law of which he would have been competent." 4"2
The Institute of International Law, at its session in Lau-
sanne in i888,44 recommended a somewhat narrower rule with
regard to the application of the lex loci contractus, which would
allow the lex loci to impose liability only in the event that the
incompetent misled the other party or "grave circumstances"
existed, the appreciation of which was to be left to the courts.
Several members of the Institute of International Law have
suggested still other compromise systems. At the meeting of
the Institute at Lausanne,Westlake 45 proposed the lex loci con-
tractus in substitution for the lex patriae when the party who
was incompetent under his national law, was twenty-one years
of age, and the other contracting party was ignorant of such in-
capacity. Von Bar4G was of the opinion that the lex loci con-
tractus should take the place of the lex patriae when the person
dealing with the party who is incompetent acted in good faith.
In his text book on Private International Law, v. Bar expressed
his view in the fdllowing form:
"It is immaterial whether or not a person has capacity to bind
himself by bill, be that incapacity a result of a general incapacity
aux lettres de change dans un pays autre que le sien, est r~gi par les lois
de ce pays, sans pouvoir invoquer sa loi nationale."
40. Clunet, 1885, p. 629.
41. Weiss IV, p. 444.
42. Annuaire de 1' Institut de Droit International Priv6, VIII, p. 97.
43. See Senate Document No. 162, 63d Congress, 1st Session, p. 64.
44. Annuaire, X, pp. 103-104.
45. Annuaire, X, p. 102.
46. Annuaire, X, p. 96.
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to contract or not, if by the law of the place where the bill is
issued the debtor had this capacity, and the person who sues on
the bill or some predecessor of his in title was in good faith when
he acquired the bill. Good faith is presumed. '47
Goldschmid submitted that the contract should be sustained,
notwithstanding an incapacity under the personal law, if it com-
plied with the law governing the validity of the contract in other
respects. 48
In addition to the above there may be mentioned the view
recently expressed by Professor Jitta, one of the most distin-
guished writers on the subject of the Conflict of Laws. In his
opinion the capacity to contract by bill or note should be gov-
erned by the law of what he terms "the fiduciary place of issue,"
by which he means the law of the place of issue mentioned in
the bill or note, and, in the absence of such an indication, that of
the party's domicile, or, in case of a person exercising a trade or
profession, the law of the state in which he has his place of busi-
ness or office.49
As the question before us has nothing to do with the per-
formance of the contract, the lex loci solutionis can apply only
on one of two theories, either that it represents the seat of the
obligation, or that it expresses the probable intention of the par-
ties. That neither of these positions is tenable as regards the
formal and essential requisites of bills and notes will be shown
in another part of this article. The same is true also with re-
spect to capacity. In this place the bare statement must suffice
that the intention theory as such is inapplicable to capacity. Be-
fore there can be a legal intent, there must be capacity to form
such intent, and such capacity, in the very nature of things, can
be conferred only by law. This is admitted by the decisions of
the courts of all countries, excepting a few dicta in this coun-
try,50 and by all text writers. There remain thus for our con-
sideration, the lex loci contractus and the lex domicilii.
The objection to the strict application of the personal law in
commercial contracts has been well expressed in the following
words by Burge:
"The obstacles to commercial intercourse between the sub-
47. v. Bar, p. 668, note.
48. See Annuaire, X, pp. 80-81.
49. Jitta, La Substance des Obligations dans le Droit International Priv6,
II, p. 53.
50. See, Mayer v. Roach, (1909) 77 N. J. L. 681, 75 Atl., 235; Basilea &
Calandra v. Spagnuola, (1910) 80 N. J. L. 88, 77 At. 531.
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jects of foreign states would be almost insurmountable, if a party
must pause to ascertain, not by the means within his reach, but
by recourse to the law of the domicile of the person with whom
he was dealing, whether the latter had attained the age of major-
ity, and, consequently, whether he is competent to enter into a
valid and binding contract."5 1"
As between the unqualified lex domicilii and that of the lex
loci contractus, the balance of convenience would clearly favor
the latter. The real question at issue is whether a compromise
system between the personal law (lex domicilii or lex patriae)
and the lex loci contractus, in the form in which it obtains in
France or Germany, or in one of the other forms suggested above,
is not preferable to that of the lex loci contractus pure and simple,
which is the rule in the United States and Italy.
Supporters of the compromise system believe that the per-
sonal law should not be discarded in its entirety and that the
needs of commerce can be sufficiently met by certain concessions
to the law of the place where the contract was entered int6.
Little argument is needed to show that neither the French nor
the German system can be approved. The French courts have
been inclined, when the contract was made in France,. to protect
French subjects acting with due care, against the incapacity of
the other contracting party existing under the lex patriae. The
objection to this qualification of the personal law is the distinction
made between citizens and foreigners. 52 If the security of com-
merce demands that an incapacity existing under foreign law
shall not be set up, it includes citizens and foreigners alike.. The
German law is equally arbitrary. It applies the lex loci to trans-
actions entered into in Germany when it will bind the party who
is incompetent under his personal law, but does not recognize
that a German subject, who has made a contract abroad, can be
held under like conditions. The giving of such a privileged posi-
tion to citizens is in violation of the principle of equality, which
is fundamental in the Conflict of Laws.
The recommendation of the Institute of International Law
adopted at its session at Lausanne, is open to the serious objec-
tion of indefiniteness, for the lex loci contractus is to apply
when "grave circumstances" exist, the appreciation of which is
to be left to the courts. Such a qualification as this is entirely
too vague to serve the purpose of commercial security.
51. Burge, II, p. 477.
52. The Supreme Court of Louisiana expressed similar views in Saul v.
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The compromise system that has the weightiest support 53
allows the application of the lex loci contractus whenever it will
sustain the contract of a party who is incompetent under his per-
sonal law.
Of the individual views above mentioned, those of Westlake
and v. Bar do not differ essentially from the compromise view
just stated. Both would require for the application of the local
law, that the party dealing with the incompetent shall have been
ignorant of the latter's incompetency (Westlake) or have acted
in good faith (v. Bar), Westlake requiring in addition that the
incompetent be twenty-one years of age. Meili regards the rule
suggested by v. Bar as the best, and as satisfying all "rational
commercial needs." 54 Goldschmid 5  properly remarks, however,
that the condition of good faith opens the door wide to difficult
questions of fact and that because of this, such a rule forms too
vaccilating a basis for the security of international relations. The
same objections may be raised also against Westlake's proposi-
tion.
Goldschmid's view differs from that of the majority before
mentioned in his substitution of the law governing the contract
for that of the lex loci contractus. In a state or country which
has adopted the lex loci solutionis for the determination of the
validity of contracts, a person who is competent under such law
would be bound under this rule notwithstanding the fact that he
is incompetent under the lex domicilii and the lex loci contractus.
For practical purposes it may be said, then, that there are only
two leading views involving a compromise between the personal
law and the lex loci contractus: (i) The majority view, which
sustains the contract, as far as capacity is concerned, if it satis-
fies either the personal law or that of the place of contracting;
and, (2) Goldschmid's view, which regards the contract as valid
if it complies with the requirements of the personal law or with
those governing the contract in other respects. Widely differing
from these, is the view entertained by Jitta, according to which
the law of the place of issue mentioned in the instrument is to
govern, and only in the absence of such an indication, the law of
His Creditors, (1827) 17 Mart. 596.
53. It will be recalled that it was recommended by the Association for the
Reform and Codification of Law (1887); by the Congresses of Com-
mercial Law of Antwerp (1885) and of Brussels (1888) ; by the Institute
of International Law (1885) ; and by the Convention of the Hague (1912).
54. Internationales Civil- und Handelsrecht, II, p. 326.
55. Annuaire, X, p. 91.
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the domicile, or, in the case of a merchant or a professional man,
the law of the state in which he has his place of business or
office.
What are the merits of these views as compared with the
-American and Italian rule, which supports the lex loci contractus?
In behalf of the lex loci contractus the following words of Jus-
tice Gray, from his opinion in Milliken v. Pratt,56 may be quoted:
"In the great majority of cases, especially in this country,
where it is so common to travel, or to transact business through
agents, or to correspond by letter, from one state to another, it
is more just, as well. as more convenient, to have regard to the
law of the place of the contract, as a uniform rule operating on
al! contracts of the same kind, and which the contracting parties
must be presumed to have in contemplation when making their
contracts, than to require them at their peril to know the domicile
of those with whom they deal, and to ascertain the law of that
domicile, howe-ver remote, which in many cases could not be done
without such delay as would greatly cripple the power of con-
tracting abroad at all."
A similar view is expressed by Burge :57
"But if the principle be correct that the lex loci contractus
ought to determine the validity of a contract when that validity
depends on the capacity of the contracting party, it must be uni-
formly applied, whether the law prevailing in the domicile be
that which capacitates or incapacitates. For it would not be
reasonable that two different laws should be applied to one and
the same contract, and that the liability of one of the parties
should be decided by the lex loci contractus and that of the other
by the lex loci domicilii."
In connection with the foregoing quotations it must be borne
in mind that Justice Gray and Burge discussed the question as a
pure judicial question, and did not express any view upon it from
the standpoint of legislation. Story calls attention to the differ-
ence between the two view points. Commenting upon a state-
ment in Saul v. His Creditors,5 he says:
56. (1877) 125 Mass. 374, at p. 382; 28 Am. Rep. 241.
57. Colonial and Foreign Law, II, p. 483.
58. The passage referred to was the following:
"But reverse the facts of this case, and suppose, as is the truth, that our
law placed the age of majority at twenty-one; that twenty-five was the
period at which a man ceased to be a minor in the country where he
resided; and that, at the age of twenty-four he came into this state, and
entered into contracts ;-would it be permitted that he should, in our
courts, and to the demand of one of our citizens, plead, as a protection
against his engagements, the laws of a foreign country, of which the people
of Louisiana had no knowledge, and would we tell them that ignorance of
foreign laws, in relation to a contract made here, was to prevent them
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"The case first put seems founded upon a principle entirely
repugnant to that upon which the second rests. In the former
case, the law of the place of the domicile of the party is allowed
to prevail, in respect to a contract made in another country. In
the latter case, the law of the place where the contract is made,
is allowed to govern without any reference whatsoever to the
law of the domicile of the party. Such a course of decision cer-
tainly may be adopted by a government if it shall so choose. But'
then it would seem to stand upon mere arbitrary legislation and
positive law, and not upon principle. The difficulty is in seeing
how a court, without any such positive legislation, could arrive
at both conclusions. General reasoning would lead us to the
opinion that both cases ought to be decided in the same -way, that
is, either by the law of the domicile of the party, or by that of
the place where the contract is actually made. Many foreign
jurists maintain the former opinion, some the latter."59
As a judicial question it might naturally be felt that an alter-
native rule in the form of the foregoing compromise systems
could not be adopted by our courts without the aid of positive
legislation and that a choice had to be made between the lex
domicilii and the lex loci contractus. In one or two instances, it
is true, English and American courts have sanctioned an alterna-
tive rule either actually or in effect. For example, the English
case of In re Hellmann's Will60 held that a legacy under an Eng-
lish will might be paid to a German legatee on his attaining full
age according to English law or according to the law of Germany,
whichever first happened. The American courts, in their eager-
ness to uphold contracts against the defence of usury, have al-
lowed the parties to contract with reference to the law of the
place of exectiti6n or with reference to that of the place of per-
formance or even with reference to the law of a third state with
which the contract was connected. 6 But these cases represent
outstanding exceptions in the Conflict of Laws to the general
attitude of Anglo-American courts, which declined to sanction
a rule in the alternative even in the matter of the formal require-
ments of instruments, 2 in regard to which the maxim locus actum
in a permissive, sense had been recognized on the continent for
enforcing it, though' the agreement was binding by those of their own
state? Most assuredly we would not." Saul v. His Creditors, (1827) 17
Mart., at pp. 597-598.
59. Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., pp. 96-97.
60. L. R. 2 Eq. 363; 14 W. R. 682.
61. Miller v. Tiffany, (1863) 1 Wall. 298; 17 Law ed. 540; Arnold v.
Potter, (1867) 22 Ia. 194; Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1914) 128
Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229; Scott v. Perlee, (1863) 39 Ohio St. 63.
62. See Stanley v. Berues, (1830) 3 Hagg. 373; Moultrie v. Hunt, (1861)
23 N. Y. 394.
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centuries. This maxim has since been adopted by statute in Eng-
land as regards wills disposing of personalty, and in many juris-
dictions of this country as regards wills and deeds. A will of
personal property is valid under these statutes if it satisfies, as
regards formal execution, the law of the testator's domicile or
that of the place of execution, and a will devising realty, or a
deed of land, if it conforms to the law of the situs or to the lex
loci contractus. In like manner it might be provided by statute
that a legal transaction, or, to narrow the question to the subject
under consideration, a commercial contract, shall be valid, as re-
gards capacity, if it meets the requirements of the law of the
place of execution or those of another state, be that law the lex
domicilii or the lex loci solutionis. But is there a sufficient reason
for the adoption of such an alternative rule in this instance?
Field, in his Outlines of an International Code, recommends
the lex loci contractus as the rule governing capacity to contract.
In Sec. 542 he states:
"The civil capacities and incapacities of an individual in refer-
ence to a transaction between living persons, except so far as it
affects immovable property, * * * are governed by the law
of the place where the transaction is had, whatever may be his
national character or domicile."
In answer to the continental writers who dwell upon the in-
convenience which would result from a fluctuating rule of capa-
city upon every accidental change of the person or of his movable
property, he says:
"The inconvenience of a fluctuating rule is an inconvenience
to the individual only, requiring him to ascertain and conform
to the law of the place where he may be. It is the most conven-
ient form for facilitating commercial transactions and the admin-
istration of justice." 683
These words were written before the Institute of International
Law and the international commercial congresses above men-
tioned had indorsed the view upholding commercial contracts
with respect to capacity, if they satisfied either the personal law
or the law of the place where, the contract was made. It is es-
pecially interesting to note, therefore, that Field had reached the
same result in an independent way, as regards foreign infants.
With respect to them he suggested the following exception:
"543. No transaction had by a foreigner, being one between
living persons, is voidable on the ground of his infancy, except
63. p. 380.
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so far as it may affect immovables, if either the law of his domi-
cile, or the law of the place where the transaction is had, sustains
his capacity."
In considering the relative merits of the compromise
systems which have been put forward on the continent, and
those of the lex loci contractus, the difference in the point of
view between the continental and American law must be
clearly borne in mind. On the continent the established
rule governing capacity, on principle, is the personal law (the
lex patriae or the lex domicilii). The only question as regards
the capacity to execute bills and notes, therefore, is whether
the personal law should not yield on grounds of commercial
convenience, at least in part, to the law of the place where the
contract is made. The problem assumes quite a different
aspect in theUnited States, where the simplicity and con-
venience of the lex loci contractus as the governing law have
seemed so manifest as to overshadow completely the claims of
the lex domicilii.6 4 Although a uniform law would raise the
question in a somewhat different form by reason of the fact
that it is concerned with international and not with inter-state
relations, 65 the burden of proving the desirability of a modi-
fication of the present law which shall sustain a bill or note,
as regards capacity, in the event the party in question is
incompetent under the lex loci contractus but has capacity
under the lex domicilii, would be upon the person proposing
such a change.
All partisans of the lex domicilii having been compelled,
on grounds of commercial convenience, to admit the neces-
sity of the application of the lex loci contractus, as regards
capacity to enter commercial contracts, when such law is un-
favorable to a party, the question naturally arising is why
the same law, rather than the lex domicilii, should not govern
also when it is favorable to such party. The main argument
advanced by continental writers in support of the lex domicilii
in the matter of capacity is the following,-that rules of law
which are concerned with capacity to act have for their object
64. Notwithstanding the fact -that the majority of an infant for the
purpose of receiving his property from his guardian is determined by the
lex domicilii. Woodward v. Woodward, (1889), 87 Tenn. 644; 11
S. W. 892.
65. The Negotiable Instruments Law has unified the law of bills and
notes in this country to all intents and purposes. Only a few jurisdic-
tions have modified the proposed uniform law in some particulars.
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the protection of the parties against loss by their own acts.
"This care for the person must be a permanent one," says v.
Bar,68 "if it is to have effect; it extends, therefore, to all persons
who permanently belong to the state, i. e., who are domiciled
there." In other words, it is because of the uniform and per-
manent protection which the parties need and which the lex
domicilii, ex hypothesi, is best able to afford that its claim to
a preference over any other law is based. But if the lex
domicilii must yield to the lex loci contractus in all commercial
contracts in the interest of commercial security, it fails to
afford the very protection which its adoption was intended to
give. Under these circumstances no theoretical basis remains
for its application. For it must be remembered that the lex
loci contractus is put forward by most of the advocates of the
compromise view as an alternative rule entitled to extra-
territorial recognition and not merely as an exception to the
lex domicilii, based upon the public policy of the state where
the contract is made, and hence having only an intra-terri-
torial effect. Having adopted the lex loci contractus as the
governing rule when it will sustain the contract, the logic of
the situation and sound principle demand that it control also
when its application will defeat the contract.67
In the absence of a willingness on the part of the American
law to accept the lex domicilii as the law governing both
status and capacity, its introduction as an alternative rule
with the lex loci in the matter of commercial capacity can be
justified only on grounds of expediency based on a desire to
sustain contracts. What does sound policy require in this
regard? The statutes relating to the formal execution of wills
and deeds fall short of giving any support to the proposition
under discussion, for neither the English nor the American
statutes include contracts. Even if it were conceded, for the
sake of argument, that the reasons or policy which led to the
adoption of these statutes apply with equal force to contracts,
it would not follow that they would embrace capacity as well.
There is a fundamental distinction between capacity and
66. Private International Law, Gillespie's translation, p. 306.
67. "There is, no doubt, much to be said for a thorough-going applica-
tion of the lex loci actus to rule capacity to undertake these obligations,
such as prevails in the jurisprudence of England and in that of the
United States, although it does not suit the circumstances of the Conti-
nent of Europe, and may, as intercourse goes on increasing, soon bring
disadvantages even to England and to the United States." v. Bar, p 665.
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formalities and a policy applicable to the one may have no
bearing upon the other. Before the statutes referred to were
passed, a will of personal property, not executed in the form
prescribed by the law of the testator's domicile at the time of
death, was void, even though it conformed to the law of the
testator's domicile at the time of execution and to the law of the
place of execution. 68 A will or deed disposing of realty Was
null and void unless it satisfied the law of the state in which
the property was situated.69 Following the continental prac-
tice, many American legislators felt that the validity of a
will or deed, as regards formal execution, should be recognized
also if the testator or grantor had followed the requirements
of the law of the state in which the will or deed was executed.
The rule locus regit actum, which was thus sanctioned, sprang
from and rests upon a desire to facilitate international inter-
course. 70 Its sole object is to free the parties from the
embarrassments which may follow if they must clothe their
legal transactions at their peril in a form prescribed by a
law to which they have no ready access at the time.
The situation is quite different, as regards capacity. The
question here is whether a party who is incompetent under
the lex loci contractus, which applies upon principle, shall be
bound nevertheless if he is competent to contract under the
law of his domicile or the law of some other state that is
deemed to govern the validity of contracts in other respects.
Before an answer can be given, the question must be con-
sidered in its broader aspects. It raises many grave problems
involving the basic theory of the rules of Private International
Law. If a rule in the alternative is proper in the matter of
commercial capacity because of its tendency to give stability
to international transactions, why should not the same policy
require its extension to capacity in general? And if the rule
is expedient in matters relating to capacity and form, why
should it not be applied also to the other essential require-
ments of contracts and, indeed, to those of all other legal
transactions? Heretofore it was taken for granted in the
science of Private International Law, that a unitary rule
governing each legal relationship would best answer the
68. Stanley v. Bernes, (1830) 3 Hagg, 373; Moultrie v. Hunt, (1861)
23 N. Y. 394.
69. Succession of Hasling, (1905) 114 La. 294; 38 So. 174.
70. See Lain6, II, pp. 116-198.
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needs of an international community. The maxim locus regit
actum, in matters of formal requirements, constituted the
only exception, and, according to some writers,71 even this
rule had lost its original permissive character and become
a unitary and mandatory rule. Must it be conceded to-day
that the aim of the science of the Conflict of Laws to discover
unitary rules for the solution of the problems arising from
the diversity of legal systems has so far failed of accomplish-
ing its object that international justice would be promoted
if the validity of legal transactions in general, as regards
capacity, form and legality, were sustained upon principles of
the broadest liberality?
The writer of this article is not ready to give a final answer
to this question, affecting as it does the very basis of the
rules in the Conflict of Laws. He is of opinion that the adop-
tion of alternative rules in matters affecting the validity of
legal transactions would afford, at least in some instances,
more satisfactory results than it is possible to attain as long
as a unitary rule must be found. Abundant proof of this
fact is furnished by the cases and in the juristic literature
dealing with the essential validity or legality of contracts.
The vast bulk of the case law, as well as the almost total
concensus of opinion of continental and English writers on
the subject of the Conflict of, Laws hold that a contract is
valid if it meets the requirements of the law with reference to
which the parties must be deemed to have contracted .72 In
most of the decided cases the law of the state that would
sustain the contract was found to be the applicatory law and
not infrequently a presumption was raised that the parties
contracted with reference to such law.73 With the recognition
of the propriety of alternative rules in the Conflict of Laws,
such cases, which now rest upon an unsatisfactory basis,
would present no difficulties whatever. Neither the territorial
theory, which underlies the doctrine of the lex loci contractus,
nor the intention theory, which is -now dominant so far as it
applies to contracts, leads to satisfactory results, as the
71. See Buzzati, L'Autoriti delle Leggi Straniere Relative alla Forma
degli Atti Civili, pp. 142 et seq.
72. For the law of the English courts, of the Federal courts, and of the
State courts, see article by Professor Beale in 23 Harvard Law Review,
pp. 1, 79, 194, 260.
73. See, for example, Pritchard v. Norton, (1882) 106 U. S. 124; 1 Sup.
Ct. 102; 27 Law Ed. 104.
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actual state of our law sufficiently attests. A rule to the effect
that the validity of a contract, as regards capacity, form, and
legality, should be recognized if it satisfies the lex loci con-
tractus or the law of some other state with'which the contract
has an intimate relation, might, with proper limitations, fur-
nish a more secure basis for international transactions than
has existed heretofore.
As for bills and notes, an alternative rule cannot be applied
to matters of form or legality for the reason that the obliga-
tions created by such instruments depend upon, and are there-
fore inseparable from, its formal and essential requirements,
as will be shown below, and an alternative rule cannot possibly
control the obligations of contracts. Limited, however, to
capacity, a rule which would sustain a bill or note, or a partic-
ular contract thereon, if it satisfied either the lex loci con-
tractus or the lex domicilii, would not only be practicable,
but would possess certain advantages over the unitary rule
of the lex locus contractus. From the standpoint of municipal
law it would promote the negotiability of such instruments
by giving to the contracts of the different parties another
chance of validity. From the broader viewpoint of inter-
national law such a rule would make it possible for the Eng-
lish law, which has tended to accept the lex domicilii, to agree
with the American law, and would bring the Anglo-American
law, so far as it can be done, into harmony with the best
thought on the subject in continental Europe.
Nor would the rule suggested constitute an injustice to the
party obligated. True, he cannot escape liability under it
unless he lacks capacity under both the lex domicilii and the
lex loci contractus, but the justice or injustice of a rule cannot
be determined from the viewpoint of a party who is desirous
of avoiding his obligations. A person who is domiciled in
one state but wishes to transact business in another cannot
in good conscience complain of a rule which enables him to
do so more effectively by increasing his capacity to contract.
As against the advantages before mentioned there must
be offset, however, certain disadvantages which inhere in every
alternative rule. The lex loci contractus as such has sim-
plicity and certainty in its favor. These important qualities
would be lost by the adoption of the lex domicilii as an alter-
native rule, for the latter might raise the issue of domicile in
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every case in which a party is incompetent under the law of
the place where the contract is made. The increased litigation
which would result would constitute a serious draw-back
which can be overcome only by strong grounds of expediency
speaking for the lex domicilii. Such grounds do not exist.
The international advantages, referred to above, cannot ac-
tually weigh heavily' in the framing of a Uniform Law for
the United States. Moreover, international uniformity is un-
attainable as long as the continental countries adhere to the
law of nationality, instead of the law of domicile, and as for
England, it may accept the doctrine of Male v. Roberts, the
lex loci contractus, as the rule governing commercial con-
tracts and thus agree with the law of this country without
the introduction of the lex domicilii. The only advantage
that would arise from the adoption of the lex domicilii in
the form suggested is its tendency to promote the negotiability
of bills and notes. This advantage, it is submitted, is not
strong enough to overcome the serious disadvantages to which
attention has been called above. The burden of proving the
desirability of departing from the established law being on
the party advocating the change, it is apparent that no suf-
ficient case has been made out. The conclusion reached is,
that the Uniform Law should adopt the lex loci contractus as
the law governing capacity to incur liability by bill or note.
If, contrary to the conclusion just stated, the policy of
sustaining contracts is deemed to outweigh the expense and
inconvenience of increased litigation, so that the principle of
an alternative rule as regards capacity, stands approved, the
question, brought to prominence by Goldschmid before the
Institute of International Law, would be whether the law
governing the contract in general should not be accepted as
the alternative rule, rather than the lex domicilii. Goldschmid
assumed that the law of the place of performance would gov-
ern the contract in general (apart from capacity and form),
and such is still the German law7 4 and the prevailing rule in
this country.75 Why should a party, who is incompetent
under the lex loci contractus, not be regarded in jurisdictions
following the above rule as competent to contract if he pos-
74. See RG July 4, 1904 (15 Niemeyer 285) ; RG Apr. 26, 1907 (18 Nie-
meyer 177).
75. See article by Professor Beale in 23 Harvard Law Review, pp. 1, 79,
194, 260.
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sesses such capacity under the law of the place of perform-
ance? This question cannot be answered until the rule gov-
erning the validity and obligation of bills and notes has been
discussed. If the conclusion is there reached that the lex
loci contractus, and not the lex loci solutionis, should control,
no ground will be left upon which Goldschmid's proposi-
tion can stand. The only other law that could possibly
control the contract would be the personal law, on the theory
that the parties must be deemed to have contracted with
reference to such law. This would make Goldschmid's rule
coincide with the one discussed above. But if the Uniform
Law should follow the weight of authority in this country
and accept the lex loci solutionis as the law determining the
validity and obligation of contracts, Goldschmid's sugges-
tion would have great force. The problem would then be
whether the lex loci solutionis should supplant the lex domi-
cilii as the alternative rule with the lex loci contractus, or
whether the Uniform Law should go still further in its liber-
ality and support a bill and note, if capacity exists under the
lex loci contractus, the lex domicilii, or the lex loci solutionis?
Whether the lex loci contractus be adopted as an absolute
rule or in one of the alternative forms suggested, its meaning
remains to be determined. On the continent it signifies gen-
erally, the law of the place where the signature is attached.76
In England and the United States, inasmuch as the contract
is not complete until the delivery of the instrument, it is the
place of delivery.77  But what if, on the continent, the place
mentioned in the instrument is not the place where the signa-
ture was actually affixed, and if, in the United States, such
place is not the actual place of delivery? Continental law
is not settled on this point.78 In this country the place from
which a bill or note or an indorsement is dated, is deemed
76. Audinet, pp. 609-610; Surville et Arthuys, p. '671; Lyon-Caen et
Renault, IV, p. 545; v. Bar, p. 671; Griinhut, Wechselrecht, II, p. 572,
note 14.
77. B. E. A. s. 21; N. I. L. s. 16.
78. In favor of the actual place where the signature was affixed Diena,
III, p. 52; Meili, II, p. 327; Griinhut, Wechselrecht, p. 570, note 6. If the
date was allowed to control, even as to holders in due course, it would
enable a party who is incompetent to confer capacity upon himself by the
simple expedient of dating the instrument or contract from a place,
according to the law of which he is competent. To allow him to do so is
regarded by the above authors as opposed to public policy.
Other authors are of opinion that the holder in due course should
be protected if the party has capacity according to the law of the place
from which it is dated. See v. Bar, p. 688.
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prima facie the place of delivery.79 With respect to a holder
in due course this presumption is conclusive.80 Where the
indorsement does not indicate the place at which it is pre-
sumptively made, i. e., delivered, but the original instrument
contains such an indication, the indorsement will be deemed
made at that place,8 and if a party has capacity under such
law, he will be estopped as to a holder in due course, to show
that he had no capacity under the law of the state where the
indorsement was made in fact.8 2
The law of the "fiduciary place of issue", proposed by
jitta as the governing rule, according to which the place
mentioned in the bill, note, or indorsement, controls, and, in
the absence of such an indication, the law of the party's domi-
cile, or, in the case of a person exercising a trade or profession,
the law of the state in which he has his place of business or
office, though it bears a slight resemblance to the American
law above set forth, differs from it too profoundly to be of
any practical value in the framing of a uniform law for the
United States. The rules of the American law should be
retained.
(To be continued.)
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79. Lennig v. Ralston, (1854) 23 Pa. 137; Second National Bank v.
Smoot, 2 MacArthur (D. C.) (1876) 371; Parks v. Evans, (1879) 5
Houst. (Del.) 576.
80. Towne v. Rice, (1877) 122 Mass. 67; Quaker City Nat. Bank v.
Showacre, (1885) 26 W. Va. 48; Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kellogg, (1905)
183 N. Y. 92; 75 N. E. 1103; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 299; 111 Am. St. Rep. 717.
81. N. I. L. s. 46.
82. Chemical Nat. Bank. v. Kellogg, (1905) 183 N. Y. 92; 75 N. E. 1103;
2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 299; 111 Am. St. Rep. 717.
